A country entering the EMU surrenders its monetary policy, and its debt becomes denominated in terms of a currency over which it has no direct control. A country's promise to uphold the …scal limits in the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact is implicitly a promise not to allow its …scal stance to deteriorate to a position in which it places pressure on the central bank to forgo its price level target to …nance …scal de…cits. Violation of these limits has raised questions about potential …scal encroachment on the monetary authority's freedom to determine the price level. We specify a simple model of …scal policy in which the …scal authority faces an upper bound on the size of its primary surplus. Policy is determined by a …scal rule, speci…ed as an error correction model, in which the primary surplus responds to debt and a target variable. We show that for the monetary authority to have the freedom to control price, the primary surplus must respond strongly enough to lagged debt. Using panel techniques that allow for unit roots and for heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence across countries, we estimate the coe¢ cients of the error correction model for the primary surplus in a panel of ten EMU countries over the period . The group mean estimate for the coe¢ cient on lagged debt is consistent with the hypothesis that the monetary authority can control the price level in the EMU, independent of …scal in ‡uence.
Introduction
The joint responsibility of monetary and …scal policy for price stability poses a potential problem for a monetary union. A single monetary authority and many …scal authorities all have the potential to in ‡uence the price level. Recognizing possible con ‡icts of interest across national governments, the founders of the European Monetary Union (EMU) drafted limits in the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) to restrain …scal expansion, by limiting de…cits and debt relative to GDP. Their main objective was to eliminate …scal in ‡uence on the price level, thereby assigning full responsibility for price stability to the European Central Bank (ECB). However, these …scal limits have been violated by several countries with no apparent ill e¤ects, seemingly strengthening arguments that the limits are unnecessary to minimize …scal in ‡uence on the price level. This leaves an open question regarding the role of …scal policy in determining the price level in the EMU.
We present a simple theoretical model of the joint behavior of real values for government debt and the primary surplus and use this model to derive the restrictions on …scal policy necessary to give the monetary authority freedom to control the price level. We assume, consistent with actual practice, that governments issue nominal debt. Additionally, we assume that taxes are distortionary, implying that there is an upper bound on the value of taxes relative to output. The upper bound on the value of taxes in turn implies an upper bound on the value of the primary surplus and therefore an upper bound on the value of 1 Fiscal Policy in the European Monetary Union debt which the primary surplus must service. Fiscal policy is speci…ed as a rule. We show that for the monetary authority to have freedom to control the price level in the presence of upper bounds, the …scal rule must be restricted to eliminate paths along which debt explodes relative to output.
This work is related to empirical work on …scal sustainability. Fiscal sustainability is interpreted as requiring satisfaction of the government's intertemporal budget constraint.
The …scal sustainability literature has typically focused on cointegration between real debt and real surplus measures (Trehan and Walsh 1991) . However, Bohn (2007) demonstrates that cointegration is unnecessarily restrictive for satisfaction of the intertemporal budget constraint and argues that a positive response of the real primary surplus to real debt is su¢ cient. Bohn (2008) and Mendoza and Ostry (2006) provide estimates of the surplus response to debt to determine …scal sustainability. Bohn …nds a positive coe¢ cient for the US, and hence sustainable …scal policy, while Mendoza and Ostry …nd some emerging market countries have positive coe¢ cients, while others do not.
This work is also related to papers which test whether …scal policy is passive or active.
A passive …scal policy requires satisfaction of the intertemporal budget constraint for any sequence of prices and, hence, adjustment of the primary surplus to real debt. But since the government's intertemporal budget constraint holds in equilibrium even when …scal policy is active, cointegration tests, based on the government's budget constraint, cannot distinguish between passive and active policies. VAR techniques, as in Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001), which determine how real debt responds to the surplus, are plagued by the fact that Fiscal Policy in the European Monetary Union at low frequencies they move together (Cochrane 1998) . Without an additional assumption on …scal policy, determination of whether …scal policy is passive or active is plagued by serious identi…cation problems. Davig, Leeper, and Chung (2007) add the assumption, that …scal policy follows a rule, to the model. 1 Under this assumption, the coe¢ cient on debt can be used to infer whether …scal policy is passive or active. Given a …scal rule with time-invariant parameters, a positive coe¢ cient on lagged debt is su¢ cient to assure that the present value of debt is always zero in the limit, irrespective of the initial real value of debt implied by the initial price level. This is a passive …scal policy. Alternatively, if the coe¢ cient on lagged debt is not positive, then the intertemporal budget constraint holds only for a unique initial real value of debt and hence for a unique initial price level. This is active …scal policy, and equilibrium requiring intertemporal budget balance can be established only at the unique price level. Without the assumption that …scal policy follows a rule, it would be impossible to reject the hypothesis of passive …scal policy because the …scal policy could change sometime in the future, a possibility unobservable to the econometrician, to assure intertemporal budget balance for any price level sequence.
The positive coe¢ cient on lagged debt in a …scal rule, required for …scal policy to be sustainable and passive, is su¢ cient to imply that real debt is expected to grow more slowly than interest, but not to imply that it is expected to grow more slowly than its upper bound.
When there is an upper bound on the value for debt, we use a simple theoretical model to determine the restrictions on the coe¢ cients in the …scal rule necessary to keep debt from 1 Davig, Leeper, and Chung (2007) assume two …scal rules with constant parameters and allow stochastic switching over time between them. For their inferences, it is important that on average their …scal rule yields active …scal policy.
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exploding relative to its upper bound. We …nd that the primary surplus must rise in response to an increase in lagged debt by at least the value of the interest rate, and we refer to a …scal policy with these restrictions as "strongly passive." If …scal policy is not strongly passive, then the economy could be shocked into a position from which debt is expected to explode relative to its upper bound. Such a path cannot be an equilibrium. As in the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL), this places pressure on the monetary authority to allow a price level jump such that the value of real debt jumps to a feasible path. 2 Therefore, failure of …scal policy to be strongly passive threatens the monetary authority's control of the price level.
We estimate the parameters of the …scal rule with annual data on real debt and primary surpluses for a panel of ten EMU countries over the period 1970-2006. Our estimation technique for the …scal rule di¤ers from others in the literature by exploiting the time series characteristics of the data, with cointegration and error correction models. These variables are integrated of order one, and, in the presence of the upper bound, theory says that they should be cointegrated. 3 Therefore, the …scal rule can be expressed as an error correction model, and the objective of the empirical work is estimation of its parameters. Another advantage of our approach is that we estimate the parameters using panel data, allowing heterogeneity across countries in both the cointegrating parameters and in the loadings on the cointegrating vectors. Panel data techniques are increasingly used to test macroeconomic 2 As Leeper (1991) demonstrated, there is no equilibrium if both monetary and …scal policy are active. Therefore, if …scal policy is active, there is pressure on the monetary authority to become passive and vice versa. 3 In the absence of an upper bound, the intertemporal budget constraint is satis…ed with debt growing forever more slowly than its upper bound. However, such an equilibrium does not imply cointegration as debt and output are growing at di¤erent rates.
hypotheses like purchasing power parity and output convergence. Panels have greater power than the usual time series tests because they combine information from both the cross-section and the time dimension.
We …nd that over the sample period, …scal policy has been su¢ ciently responsive to increases in debt in our panel of ten EMU countries to imply that it is strongly passive. This provides evidence that violation of the limits in the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP have not been serious enough to threaten the ability of the ECB to control the price level.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the behavior of monetary and …scal policy in a monetary union and derives the restrictions on the parameters of the …scal rule necessary for a strongly passive policy. Section 3 contains the empirical analysis, and Section 4 provides conclusions.
Model

Goods and Asset Markets
We assume that countries in the monetary union are small enough that they cannot a¤ect the world price level or world interest rate. There is a single good in the world, implying that equilibrium in goods markets requires the law of one price. Normalizing the world price level at unity and assuming no world in ‡ation implies that, in equilibrium, the price level in the monetary union is the exchange rate.
We assume that international creditors are willing to buy and sell government bonds in the monetary union as long as the interest rate on these bonds (r t ) satis…es interest rate parity. 
where E t denotes the expectation conditional on time t information and P t denotes the price level, and equivalently the exchange rate, in the monetary union.
The monetary authority can control expected in ‡ation because it can control the nominal interest rate (r t ). Interest rate parity implies that the monetary authority's choice of the nominal interest rate determines expected in ‡ation. 4 Leeper (1991) demonstrated that in order for the monetary authority to control the price level, …scal policy must be passive. We show below that in the presence of the upper bound, …scal policy must be strongly passive.
Fiscal Policy
Government Flow Budget Constraint
Consider the ‡ow government budget constraint for the i th country in a monetary union.
Letting G it , T it , B p it and M it denote, respectively, nominal government spending, tax revenue, publicly held government bonds, and the money supply backed by the i th country's bonds at time t, the i th government's nominal ‡ow budget constraint is given by
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Dividing by P t , the real values of debt and the primary surplus can be expressed respectively as
where rt 1+rt
M it is seigniorage revenues returned to the i th country by the monetary authority.
The government's real ‡ow budget constraint can be expressed as
Imposing interest rate parity from equation (1) and de…ning it = 1
such that it > 0 denotes positive in ‡ation, which reduces the real value of outstanding debt, the equation for the evolution of real debt can be expressed as
where ( it E t 1 it ) represents unanticipated in ‡ation or, equivalently, a price level shock.
Unanticipated in ‡ation acts like a tax, which raises revenue. Additionally, this equation reveals that real debt accumulates in response to expectations of in ‡ation, which are not realized. Expectations of in ‡ation raise the interest rate, and when the in ‡ation does not occur, debt accumulates in response to the higher interest rate.
Fiscal Policy Rule
Fiscal policy is de…ned by the behavior of the primary surplus. We assume that the …scal authority is able to commit to a rule, 5 and that the rule is determined by an optimization problem, which we do not explicitly model. The general nature of the optimization problem is as follows. Governments choose taxes and spending to maximize the expected present discounted value of utility of its own representative agent, subject to stochastic shocks and a ‡ow budget constraint, allowing nominal debt to smooth the e¤ect of shocks. Government spending yields utility, and taxes are distortionary with distortions increasing in the level of taxes as in Barro (1979) . The distortionary nature of taxes implies that there is an upper bound on the value of taxes the government can raise. The upper bound on the value of taxes in turn implies an upper bound on the size of the primary surplus. 6 Endowments, government spending, and taxes are subject to stochastic shocks due to politics, war, natural disasters, or business cycles. The …scal rule we estimate is a parsimonious linear approximation to the reduced-form solution that such a model would imply.
The …scal rule for the i th country is given by
where c i is a constant, (1 i ) measures persistence in the primary surplus, s it 1 is the value for the target surplus, s it is the upper bound on the surplus, and it is a stochastic disturbance
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representing …scal shocks. The lagged value of the surplus re ‡ects the desire to smooth the e¤ect of shocks over time. Stochastic shocks re ‡ect both politically-determined shocks to taxes or government spending, and responses, perhaps countercyclical or optimal tax, of the …scal authority to the fundamental shocks that a¤ect the economy. The commitment to honor debt for any sequence of shocks, which each country makes to enter the monetary union, implies that the surplus should respond to lagged debt. The surplus is assumed to adjust to a linear combination of the target surplus and debt service with the weights determined by i . The assumption that each government maximizes the utility of its own representative agent implies that no government would choose to raise its surplus to compensate for a low surplus in a member country, 7 implying that the debt and surplus of other member countries have no e¤ect on the surplus.
To complete the model of …scal policy, it is necessary to make some assumptions about the behavior of the target surplus and the upper bound on the surplus in an economy with growing income. We assume that both the target (s it ) and the upper bound ( s it ) on the surplus are linear in real GDP (y it ) ; and test the assumption on the target surplus in the empirical implementation. The target surplus and its upper bound are given respectively by
where k i represents the country speci…c …xed e¤ects and ' i represents the heterogeneous country speci…c percentages of real GDP. Substituting for the target surplus in equation (5) Fiscal Policy in the European Monetary Union yields a …scal rule in which the surplus responds to the lagged surplus, lagged debt, lagged output, and an error term.
Finally, we must specify a dynamic process for real GDP. We assume that real GDP is independent of the government surplus and debt and that it is integrated of order one, consistent with our empirical evidence presented below. Additionally, since the model for the surplus and debt is linear in levels, we approximate geometric growth in GDP with linear growth and assume that real GDP is determined by
where i re ‡ects autocorrelation in growth, g i is the equilibrium growth rate, and it is a well-behaved output shock.
The value for c i in equation (5) is determined to allow an equilibrium in which the primary surplus equals its target (k i + ' i y it 1 ), and the growth in debt service r(b it b it 1 ) equals the growth in the primary surplus (s it s it 1 ).
; substituting into equation (5), and rearranging yields
Equation (9) is an error correction representation of the …scal rule with two error correction terms. Substituting equation (9) into the government's ‡ow budget constraint, given by 
Equations (8), (9), and (10) are the dynamic equations of the model, written to reveal the nature of a stationary equilibrium. In a stationary equilibrium, the primary surplus equals its target and pays less than the interest rate on debt, allowing debt service to grow with output. The relationship between the variables in the stationary equilibrium is given by
Deviations from these values, due to shocks, are stationary with the system expected to return to the equilibrium relationship in the future. When equation (11) holds, the primary surplus is expected to change by ' i g i from equation (9) and debt is expected to change by
from equation (10) . Since output is expected to change by g i , variables are expected to retain the relationship given by equation (11) . 
Stability and Dynamics in Equilibrium
De…nition 1 Given constant values for the world interest rate and the world price level, a time series process for each y it from equation (8), a …scal rule for each of the i countries from equation (9), and an upper bound on each country's primary surplus from equation (7), an equilibrium is a set of time series processes for the monetary union price level, P t ; and for each country's primary surplus and debt, s it and b it ; such that each government's ‡ow budget constraint, given by equation (10), holds, the debt for each country is not expected to exceed its upper bound, and world agents expect to receive the return on assets determined by interest rate parity, equation (1).
The time paths for each country's surplus and debt can be determined by solving equations (8), (9) , and (10). Denoting deviations of the primary surplus from its equilibrium values, given respectively by output and debt service, and deviations of output growth from its equilibrium value as
the system can be rearranged as
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Note, …rst, that the de…nition of equilibrium is inconsistent with paths along which debt and the primary surplus explode relative to their equilibrium values, determined by output.
An exploding debt would increase the primary surplus toward its upper bound. Beyond that point the primary surplus could not increase further to service increasing debt, implying that agents would not lend along such a path in equilibrium. Therefore, a dynamic equilibrium requires that the dynamic system for each country be either globally stable or saddlepath stable. Stability implies that the deviations of the primary surplus about its equilibrium values should ‡uctuate about zero, and thus ruling out paths along which the surplus and debt explode relative to output. If the primary surplus, debt, and output are integrated of order one, then existence of either a saddlepath stable or a globally stable equilibrium implies cointegration among these variables. This is the …rst testable hypothesis of the model, but cointegration alone does not allow inference about whether …scal policy is passive or active. 9 Letting i represent eigenvalues, the characteristic equation for a country is given by
We assume that the eigenvalues of the characteristic equation for each country are real and distinct. The i are empirically less than one. 10 We also assume that the errors are independent and identically distributed. 11 If the remaining eigenvalues of the characteristic equation for the i th country are within the unit circle, then the economic system for the 9 In the absence of upper bounds, cointegration is not a necessary characteristic of equilibrium because debt and the surplus can grow forever relative to output. With upper bounds cointegration could occur as the price level and real debt adjust to the surplus instead of as the surplus adjusts to real debt. 10 The group mean estimate of is 0.35. 11 We allow it to be autocorrelated in the empirical estimation and consider at that point how the requirements for global stability are modi…ed. 14 This criteria, which requires only i > 0; is weaker than the one we consider. Under passive …scal policy, with the standard assumption that the real interest rate exceeds the rate of growth of output, debt and debt service could grow faster than output, eventually exceeding any speci…c fraction of output. When taxes are distortionary, this cannot represent an equilibrium. 15 Passive …scal policy restricts debt to grow more slowly than the interest rate in the limit, while strongly passive policy restricts it to grow more slowly than output in the limit.
To summarize, when governments maximize the welfare of their own agents and taxes are distortionary, implying an upper bound on the value of the debt, an equilibrium, in which the monetary authority has freedom to choose the price level, requires that the system of equations containing the debt and surplus for each country be globally stable. Under the 13 This is under the assumption that roots are real and that 0 < (1 + r) (1 ) < 1, which is empirically veri…ed. 14 Bohn (2008) shows that either is correct, provided the correct discount factor is used. The present value of debt, discounted at the real interest rate, and the present value of debt relative to output, discounted at the growth adjusted real interest rate, must approach zero. 15 Who will work when taxes become 100% of income?
assumption that the …scal authority follows a rule with time-invariant parameters, global stability is assured when the response of the primary surplus to debt is su¢ ciently strong in each country, such that i > 1 for all i countries.
It is important to recognize that the assumption that …scal policy follows a rule with timeinvariant parameters is an assumption. Even if we found that the response of the primary surplus to lagged debt were too small for both eigenvalues to be within the unit circle, the monetary authority could still control the price level if the government were expected to adjust the primary surplus in the future in some way that di¤ers from the current estimated rule (Davig, Leeper, Chung 2007). However, promises of future changes to resolve current insolvency might not be credible. The justi…cation for a rule is that it enhances transparency and credibility of policy and avoids problems of dynamic inconsistency.
Empirical Results
The purpose of the empirical work is to provide estimates of the parameters in the …scal rule, given by equation (9) . The estimated values for i allow determination of whether the ECB has the ability to control the price level or not. Additionally, estimation of the …scal rule provides parameter values which other researchers can use to calibrate …scal policy. We have annual data on the real primary surplus, s it , real debt, b it , and real GDP, y it , for the period 1970-2006 for a panel of ten EMU countries. 16 We assume that there is no structural break in the …scal rule over the sample and test this assumption, failing to reject the null of They are computed alternately using one lag, two lags, and heterogeneous numbers of lags across countries, with the lag order estimated using consistent information criteria such as the Akaike and Schwarz criteria. Table 1 reports the results with one lag. All the tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in s it , b it ; and y it at the 5 percent level, implying that the variables s it , b it and y it are I (1).
17
Given that the variables in the …scal rule appear to behave as unit root processes, equation (9) takes the form of an error correction model. There is a cointegrating vector between the real primary surplus and real GDP and between the real primary surplus and real debt, implied by the equilibrium relationships, which are represented as error correction terms.
The real primary surplus adjusts to these two error correction terms.
Since the time dimension of our sample is not long enough to allow estimation of an 17 We also fail to reject the null of a unit root when we use Breitung (2000) To estimate the error correction model in (9), we employ a two-step procedure. In the …rst step, the cointegrating parameters r i and ' i are estimated. Even though theory implies that the real interest rates should be identical across countries, we allow them to vary due to possible di¤erences in the de…nitions of debt or the primary surplus across countries. In the second step, the estimated cointegrating coe¢ cients are used to obtain the group mean panel estimates of the parameters, GM and GM . The main focus of this paper is obtaining an estimate of the parameter, GM ; and testing whether it is signi…cantly larger than one.
Next, we con…rm the existence of cointegrating relationships between the real primary surplus and real debt, and between the real primary surplus and real GDP using the group mean panel cointegration t tests suggested by Pedroni (1999 Pedroni ( , 2004 . 18 Both tests are residualbased cointegration tests, which test the null hypothesis that the variables of interest are not 18 The group mean statistics allow modeling an additional source of potential heterogeneity across individual members of the panel. Moreover, Gutierrez (2003) 19 We account for cross-sectional dependence and cross-member cointegration by using common time e¤ects. 20 For the semi-parametric test we use the Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West bandwidth selection procedure, and for the parametric ADF-type test, we use the step-down procedure to estimate the number of lags. The results, reported in Table   19 The speci…cations are given in the Appendix. 20 Common time e¤ects allow us to model a limited form of cross-sectional dependence and cross-member cointegration (which is a form of long run cross-sectional dependence). Common time e¤ects assume that the cross-sectional dependence correlation between country i and j is identical for all i; j. Thus, in the presence of heterogeneous cross-sectional dependence, subtracting o¤ the cross-sectional average does not completely eliminate cross-sectional dependence. The method by which cross-sectional dependence is modeled in panels is still an active area of research. Bai and Ng (2002) and Moon and Perron (2004) consider models in which the error terms have a factor structure in panel unit root tests, however the implications for such factor models have not been studied in the panel cointegration context. Notice though that time e¤ects are a special case of a factor model where there is a single common factor and the response of each country is similar. Therefore, time e¤ects account for both cross-sectional dependence and cross-member cointegration when the source of dependency is due to a single common time speci…c shock.
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2, indicate that both tests reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5 percent level. 21 Pedroni's tests provide strong evidence that s it and b it are cointegrated and that s it and y it are also cointegrated.
We con…rm that there are two cointegrating relations in the trivariate model using the sys- The sequential procedure continues until the null is not rejected or the hypothesis q = 2 is rejected. The test is computed using one-lag di¤erence terms and it includes individual speci…c …xed e¤ects. In Table 3 we verify that there are two cointegrating relations in the model. The panel test statistic indicates that q = 2 in the model with three variables s it , b it and y it . This implies that there is a single stochastic trend in the data, implying that there are cointegrating relations between s it and b it ; and between s it and y it ; consistent with previous results.
To estimate the cointegrating parameters, we use Pedroni's (2000, 2001) group mean fully modi…ed OLS (FMOLS) procedure for cointegrated panels, which is based on equation 21 We also reject the null of no cointegration at the 5 percent level when we use all seven panel statistics of Pedroni (1999 Pedroni ( , 2004 . Additionally, we reject the null of no cointegration at the 5 percent level when we do not use the common time e¤ects.
Fiscal Policy in the European Monetary Union (13) . 22 The group mean FMOLS procedure accommodates the heterogeneity that is typically present both in the transitional serial correlation dynamics and in the long run cointegrating relationships. It is a semi-parametric approach that adjusts for the e¤ects of endogenous regressors and short-run dynamics of the errors. 23 We use the Bartlett kernel and the NeweyWest bandwidth selection procedure as suggested by Pedroni (2000) . The results, in Table   4 , indicate that the group mean panel estimate for the real interest rate is 4.22 percent (r GM = 0:0422) and for the target primary surplus is 3.88 percent of GDP (' GM = 0:0388).
24
In the …nal step we consider estimation of the group mean panel …scal policy parameters GM and GM . It is important to recognize that the error term in equation (9) could be autocorrelated in the data. If so, then the error could be correlated with the right-hand-side variables, biasing estimates of the coe¢ cients on the error-correction terms. Therefore, we use Sims '(1980) likelihood ratio test to determine the appropriate number of lags to fully capture the dynamics for each country. For some countries, the test chooses a single lag in levels, implying that equation (9) is appropriately speci…ed. However, for others, two 22 Bohn (2008) considers a similar equation with x it given by debt, using over two centuries of US data on the primary surplus, output, and debt. His real data series have severe heteroskedasticiy, due to two centuries of growth in real GDP. He reduces, but does not eliminate, these problems by dividing by real GDP. Standard deviations for real variables are 64 to 98 times as high in the second period as in the …rst. For variables expressed as a fraction of GDP, this number falls to something a little larger than 2. We have a very di¤erent data set from Bohn's -a relatively short time dimension and ten countries. The shorter time dimension implies that we do not have Bohn's heteroskedasticity problem. Ratios of standard deviations in the second half of the sample relative to the …rst half average to something less than 2, similar to his adjusted data. Also, division by GDP would eliminate the unit root characteristics of the data which we exploit to obtain super-consistent estimates of the cointegrating parameters. 23 Since FMOLS is designed to reduce bias associated with short-run dynamics and the estimates in the I(1) model are super-consistent, it is not necessary to add stationary variables, like HP-…ltered measures of the data, as in Bohn's model with stationary data (2008) . 24 The FMOLS results are robust to the choice of kernel and bandwidth. We obtain almost identical estimates when we use the Parzen and quadratic spectral (QS) kernels and the Andrews (1991) bandwidth selection procedure. Additionally, we obtain similar estimates when we use the group mean dynamic OLS (DOLS) procedure of Pedroni (2004) and the two-step estimator of Breitung (2005 
A perisistent, but negative surplus shock, perhaps created by a war, would imply a negative error in the …rst cointegrating relation and rising past government debt, implying a negative correlation between the two terms. Therefore, failure to include the lagged change in debt could bias the estimate on the coe¢ cient on the error in the cointegrating residual. 26 Now, consider estimation of the coe¢ cients on the error correction terms in equation (14) .
First, we use the estimated cointegrating parameters of the interest rate and target surplus to construct the error correction terms for each country. Then we estimate the coe¢ cients of the error correction model, augmented with lagged changes in variables, providing estimates for GM and GM . We use the group mean procedure recommended by Pesaran and Smith (1995) .
27 25 The additional dynamics modify slightly the conditions under which i > 1 is su¢ cient to assure global stability, that is for all roots to be within the unit circle. For 1i = 0; as is veri…ed empirically, we need 0 < (1 ) (1 + r) + 2 < 1; which also holds empirically. 26 Using long US samples of one and two centuries that highlight the role of wars, Bohn (1998 Bohn ( , 2008 expresses the …scal rule in terms of the surplus and debt as a fraction of output, and …nds it necessary to add HP-…lter measures of transitory values of the variables to distinguish between the response of the surplus to permanent and transitory shocks and reduce "omitted variables bias." Transitory, but persistent government spending, as associated with a war, would be accompanied by rising debt implying that the residual would be low when debt is high relative to the surplus. The error correction model deals with this by adding lagged changes of the model variables. In this example the lagged change in debt would be high in a war and would play the role of Bohn's transitory military spending, and the lagged change in output would play the role of Bohn's HP-…ltered output. 27 They show that when the parameters of interest are heterogeneous, the group mean procedure provides consistent estimates, whereas the pool panel procedures give inconsistent estimates.
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For the second step of the two-step procedure, in which the cointegrating parameters are estimated …rst and used to construct the error correction terms for use in the second step, all the variables in the model (14) are stationary. Asymptotically, the fact that we use the estimated error correction terms rather than the true error correction terms in (14) does not a¤ect the standard properties of our estimates due to the super-consistency properties of the estimator of the cointegrating relationships. 28 Table 5 indicates that GM = 0:51
and GM = 1:30; where GM is signi…cantly larger than one.
29
Our estimates also imply substantial persistence in the surplus equation, (1 GM ) = 0:49:
The theory requires that each country's i = GM + 2i > 1, not that the group mean estimate, GM ; be greater than one. We test whether each country's individual estimate of i = GM + 2i is statistically signi…cant di¤erent from GM . We do not reject the null hypothesis that each country's parameter is equal to the group mean at the 5 percent level.
Therefore, since all i are not statistically signi…cant di¤erent from the GM , and since the GM estimate is signi…cantly larger than one, our best inference is that all i > 1, implying the …scal policy in the EMU is su¢ ciently responsive to debt for the system to be globally stable. Using our terminology, we cannot reject the null that …scal policy in each country is strongly passive, allowing monetary policy to determine the price without …scal in ‡uence.
We note also, that our tests imply …scal sustainability and passive …scal policy since the criteria for both is a positive value for GM :
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We have not allowed estimates of the parameters of the error correction model to change as the monetary union has evolved over time. However, if the coe¢ cients in the cointegrating relationships had changed and no account were taken for the change, then we should not have rejected the null of no cointegration. The values for the coe¢ cients on the error correction terms could have changed. To test for a change in , we break the sample into two subperiods, the pre-Maastricht era and the post-Masstricht era. Table 6 shows that GM in both sub-samples is larger than one and similar in size, although variances are too high to yield signi…cance. The split sample evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the surplus is su¢ ciently responsive to debt to give the monetary authority control of the price level in both sub-samples. 30 
Conclusion
A country entering the EMU surrenders its monetary policy and its debt becomes denominated in terms of a currency over which it has no direct control. A country's promise to uphold the limits in the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP is implicitly a promise not to allow its …scal policy to threaten the ability of the ECB to control the price level. However, many countries have violated these limits. This leaves an open question regarding the role of …scal policy in determining the price level in the EMU.
We assume that there is an upper bound on the present value of the primary surplus, motivated by an upper bound on distortionary taxes which a government can raise to service
Fiscal Policy in the European Monetary Union the debt. This implies an upper bound on debt. Fiscal policy is assumed to follow a …scal rule with time-invariant parameters. For the ECB to have power to control the price level in the EMU, the …scal rule must imply that debt is not expected to explode relative to its upper bound. We show that this requires that the primary surplus responds to an increase in real debt by at least enough to pay interest on the debt. We call such a policy "strongly passive"
since the criteria are stronger than those requiring the expected present-value of debt to vanish in the limit, as with passive policy. We show that a strongly passive …scal policy yields a model which is globally stable, such that initial deviations of the primary surplus from its target and from debt service are expected to vanish in the long run for any initial values. This gives the monetary authority the freedom to determine price in equilibrium.
This paper estimates a rule for the primary surplus to determine whether …scal policy in EMU countries is strongly passive. Note: (1 GM ) is the group mean panel estimate for persistence and GM is the group mean panel estimate, which is statistically larger than one, that implies a strongly passive …scal policy. i;GM are the group mean panel estimates for the coe¢ cients on the lagged change in surplus, the lagged change in debt and the lagged change in output. The **
